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Elevated anxiety sensitivity and the tendency to catastrophically misinterpret
ambiguous bodily sensations has been demonstrated in people who experience
nonclinical levels of panic (Richards, Austin, & Alvarenga, 2001), and anxiety
sensitivity has been shown to be associated with insecure attachment in adoles-
cents and young adults (Weems, Berman, Silverman, & Saavedra, 2001). This
study investigated the relationship between attachment style, anxiety sensitivity
and catastrophic misinterpretation among 11 nonclinical panickers and 58
nonanxious controls aged 18 to 19 years. Participants completed the Brief Bodily
Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (BBSIQ), Anxiety Sensitivity Index
(ASI) and an attachment questionnaire. The hypothesis that insecurely attached
individuals would demonstrate greater catastrophic misinterpretation and higher
anxiety sensitivity than securely attached individuals was not supported; however,
nonclinical panickers gave more anxiety-related interpretations of ambiguous
internal stimuli than nonanxious controls. Results do not support the notion that
attachment style is related to anxiety sensitivity or catastrophic misinterpretation
(regardless of panic experience). Results do, however, support the notion that
anxiety-related misinterpretation of ambiguous somatic sensations precedes the
onset of panic disorder.
Anxiety sensitivity refers to a fear of anxiety symptoms based on an individual’sbelief that these symptoms have harmful physical or social consequences
(Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986) and has been identified as a risk factor
for the development of spontaneous panic attacks (Donnell & McNally, 1990;
Maller & Reiss, 1992). Furthermore, research has shown that anxiety sensitivity is
factorially distinct from trait anxiety (Taylor, Koch, & Crockett, 1991), and that
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anxiety sensitivity may play an important role in the development and maintenance
of anxiety disorders in adolescents (Lau, Calamari, & Waraczynski, 1996).
Clark’s (1986) cognitive model of panic provides a foundation for predicting the
relationship between anxiety sensitivity and panic (Maller & Reiss, 1992). Clark’s
catastrophic misinterpretation model proposes that panic arises from the misinterpreta-
tion of ambiguous bodily sensations as precursors to an impending medical or psy-
chological emergency. For example, tachycardia may be misinterpreted as an
impending heart attack, and dissociation may be interpreted as impending insanity.
Empirical investigations of panickers’ cognitive biases in interpreting ambiguous
stimuli have provided some supportive evidence for Clark’s (1986) theory (but not
always — for a review of the literature see Austin & Richards, 2001). For example,
McNally and Foa (1987) investigated the extent to which agoraphobics with panic
interpret ambiguous stimuli in a threatening way and found that agoraphobics were
more likely to interpret internal (somatic) and external ambiguous stimuli as threat-
ening than normal controls.
To measure catastrophic misinterpretation, Clark et al. (1997) developed the
Body Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ) and its brief form (BBSIQ),
both of which consist of a number of ambiguous scenarios pertaining to internal
stimuli (e.g., ‘You feel short of breath. Why?’) or external events (e.g., ‘You smell
smoke. Why?’) that respondents are asked to interpret. Clark et al. employed the
BBSIQ in a combination of three studies, in order to extend and clarify the findings
of previous research. They found that people with panic disorder (PD) were more
likely than a combined general anxiety disorder (GAD)/social phobia group and
nonanxious controls to misinterpret bodily sensations in a catastrophic way, suggest-
ing interpretive bias is a feature specific to PD. Clark et al. suggested that this inter-
pretive bias should also be evident in nonclinical panickers (i.e., people who have
experienced spontaneous panic but do not meet criteria for PD), as the catastrophic
misinterpretation model of panic was developed to explain spontaneous panic
attacks, not PD specifically.
Richards et al. (2001) aimed to investigate whether the cognitive biases demon-
strated by people with PD are demonstrated similarly by people who experience
nonclinical panic (NCP), and how anxiety sensitivity is related to this bias.
Participants consisted of 20 people with PD, 25 NCPs and 69 nonanxious controls.
Results suggested an interpretive bias towards catastrophising ambiguous interocep-
tive stimuli among both the NCP and PD groups, and high anxiety sensitivity pre-
dicted threat interpretations towards both internal and external ambiguous stimuli
for both groups. Given that NCPs are at heightened risk of developing PD, the
results suggested that misinterpretation bias and anxiety sensitivity are potential
risk factors for the development of PD.
In an investigation of the relationship between cognitive bias and anxiety in
childhood and adolescence, Weems et al. (2001) found that anxiety sensitivity was
predicted by catastrophising. Such a finding is not surprising on the basis of previ-
ous research with adults; however, the authors went on to suggest the need for a
cognitive model to address this relationship. Despite anxiety sensitivity and inter-
pretive bias having both been proposed as risk factors for the development of panic
and PD in adults, little consideration has been given as to how these characteristics
may develop from an individual’s experiences in childhood and adolescence.
Insecure attachment has been implicated in the development of anxiety and
anxiety disorders (Bowlby, 1973; Priel & Shamai, 1995; Muris, Meesters, Van
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Melick, & Zwambag, 2001; Warren, Huston, Egeland, & Sroufe, 1997).
Attachment theory was first described by Bowlby (1969, 1977) to conceptualise the
proclivity of humans to seek strong and enduring affectional bonds with specific
others. Bowlby (1969) described attachment behaviour in adulthood as being ‘… a
straightforward continuation of attachment behaviour in childhood …’, which
despite having weakened with age, will continue to play a vital role ‘from the cradle
to the grave’ (pp. 255, 256).
In a landmark study, Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, and Wall (1978) coded infant
attachment behaviours into three categories. Securely attached infants were compli-
ant, cooperative and harmonious in interactions with their mothers. These infants
displayed less anxiety in comparison to those in other groups and appeared confi-
dent that their mothers would be responsive to their needs, suggesting a distinct
advantage in aspects of social and cognitive development. Two patterns charac-
terised by insecure attachment were identified. Children demonstrating
anxious/ambivalent attachment presented with chronic levels of anxiety interspersed
with angry resistance. Mothers of these children failed to respond contingently,
which was reflected in infants’ lack of confidence in their mother’s accessibility and
responsiveness, and intense distress upon her departure. The final category, avoidant
attachment, described those children who were rejecting, detached and defensive in
their attachment behaviour. Mothers of these children tended to be rejecting and
find physical contact with their child aversive, making for chronically frustrated
and angry infants.
Despite indications of a relationship between early attachment and anxiety as
well as evidence for the role of cognitive biases in the development of panic, there
is a dearth of research considering the relationship between these findings. In the
only study to date, Weems, Berman, Silverman, and Rodriguez (2002) investigated
the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and attachment style in a sample of 203
adolescents (mean age 15.7 years) and 324 young adults (mean age 21.7 years).
They found that for both adolescents and young adults, insecurely attached individ-
uals had significantly higher levels of anxiety sensitivity than did the securely
attached individuals. Weems et al. suggested that the cognitive response styles of
insecurely attached individuals may give rise to distorted and selective encoding of
anxiety-related sensations. This in turn may influence the development of high
anxiety sensitivity.
Chorpita and Barlow (1998) have suggested that greater attention be paid to the
developmental aspects of adult disorders, and that research should be conducted
into how those factors influencing adult anxiety manifest themselves in childhood.
Although early attachment experiences have been implicated in the development
of anxiety and anxiety sensitivity, to our knowledge no attempts have been made to
determine the relationship, if any, between attachment style and interpretive bias.
Additionally, no research has examined the influences of early attachment on panic
or PD specifically, but rather anxiety disorders in aggregate has been the focus.
In order to investigate how interpretive bias might develop in a subclinical panic
population whose age group has been implicated in marking the initial onset of PD
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), the present study examined the relation-
ship between attachment style and interpretive bias in older adolescents who experi-
enced NCP compared to nonanxious controls. Specifically it was hypothesised that
(a) insecurely attached individuals would be more likely to catastrophically misinter-
pret ambiguous stimuli than securely attached individuals, (b) insecurely attached
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individuals would demonstrate significantly higher levels of anxiety sensitivity than
securely attached individuals, and (c) NCPs would be more likely to catastrophically
misinterpret ambiguous stimuli than nonanxious controls (NACs).
Method
Participants
Sixty-nine participants (4 males and 65 females) aged 18 or 19 years were recruited
from the student population of the University of Ballarat, Australia. Participants
were students taking a first-year psychology elective who gained credit towards their
course requirements for participating.
Two natural groups were identified. The nonanxious control group (NAC) con-
sisted of people with no diagnosable psychological disorder and no experience of
spontaneous panic (n = 58), and the second consisted of nonclinical panickers
(NCP; n = 11). To meet the criteria for NCP participants must have reported expe-
riencing at least one spontaneous panic attack in the past 2 years, have indicated
mild or no worry about future attacks on the Panic Disorder Severity Scale (Shear et
al., 1997), have no other identifiable mental health problem (including PD), and
have not sought professional psychological help for panic attacks. Those partici-
pants meeting the criteria for any diagnosable psychiatric condition were excluded
from the study.
Participants were grouped according to their panic status (NAC, NCP) and
attachment style (secure, insecure). Sixteen per cent of participants met the criteria
for NCP (n = 11), while the remaining 84% were NACs (n = 58). Eighty per cent
of participants were classified as securely attached (n = 55), 16% as avoidantly
attached (n = 11) and a further 4% as anxious/ambivalently attached (n = 3).
Participants in the avoidant and anxious/ambivalent categories were grouped into
one insecurely attached group (n = 14).
Measures
Primary Care Evaluation of Mental Disorders Clinician Evaluation Guide. The
Primary Care Evaluation of Mental Disorders Clinician Evaluation Guide (Prime-
MD; Spitzer, Williams, Kroenke, & Linzer, 1994) is a brief structured clinical inter-
view that was used to screen participants for psychiatric disorders and to make an
initial determination of their panic status. It consists of five modules for the diagno-
sis of anxiety disorders, mood disorders, somatoform disorders, eating disorders and
alcohol abuse/dependence, as defined in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association,
1994). In addition to the existing items, the Anxiety Module was modified by
asking the question, ‘have you experienced a panic attack in the previous 2 years?’.
The Prime-MD has been demonstrated to possess good validity when matched
against more extensive clinical interviews conducted by mental health practitioners
(Sears, Danda, & Evans, 1999; Spitzer et al., 1994). The interview was administered
by the second author who is a graduate psychology student at the University of
Ballarat and was supervised and trained by the senior author (a psychologist) to use
the instrument to commonly accepted standards.
Panic Disorder Severity Scale. The PDSS is a 7-item interview scale that was com-
pleted by participants identified as NCPs, in order to clarify and confirm the non-
clinical Prime-MD assessment. It provides information about the frequency and




severity of panic attacks, the severity of anticipatory anxiety regarding future
attacks, phobic avoidance related to panic, and impairment to work and social func-
tioning as a consequence of panic symptoms. Excellent interrater reliability (.87),
moderate internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .65) and favourable convergent and
discriminant validity have been demonstrated for the PDSS (Shear et al., 1997).
Attachment Questionnaire — Modified Version. A modified version of Hazan and
Shaver’s (1987) Attachment Questionnaire (AQ-M) was used to assess participants’
attachment styles. The original questionnaire consists of three descriptions, each of
which corresponds to a specific attachment typology identified in infants
(Ainsworth et al., 1978), but translated into terms appropriately reflecting adult
romantic love. Despite the discrete, categorical nature of this instrument, previous
research has reported its adequate reliability and validity (Hazan & Shaver, 1987;
Lyddon, Bradford, & Nelson, 1993; Muris et al., 2001). Two of the three items
underwent minor modification in order to improve the face validity of the measure
for the Australian adolescent sample, many of whom were assumed to not be in a
committed romantic relationship. In item 2 the term ‘love partners’ was changed to
‘significant others’. In item 3 the use of ‘my partner’ was substituted with ‘people I
am closest to’, and the phrase ‘I want to merge completely with another person’ was
replaced by ‘I want to be very close to another person’. Participants were asked to
indicate the description that best described their own feelings in close relationships
in order to identify their attachment style.
Anxiety Sensitivity Index. The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss et al.,
1986) is a 16-item self-report measure of anxiety sensitivity. Each item pertains
to beliefs about possible negative consequences of anxiety symptoms. For exam-
ple, ‘it scares me when my heart beats rapidly’ and ‘unusual body sensations
scare me’. Participants are asked to respond on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from very little to very much. Evidence for the psychometric soundness of the ASI
exists, based on its single factor structure (Reiss et al., 1986), and test–retest
reliability of .71 over 3 years (Maller & Reiss, 1992). Additionally, there is
strong evidence for the construct validity of the ASI as a distinct measure of fear
of anxiety, separate from the experience of general and trait anxiety (e.g., Reiss
et al., 1986; Taylor et al., 1991).
Brief Bodily Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire. Adapted from McNally and
Foa’s (1987) Interpretation Questionnaire, the BBSIQ is a 14-item instrument con-
sisting of a number of potentially threatening ambiguous scenarios that participants
were asked to interpret. Two classes of ambiguous events are included: internal stim-
uli (n = 7), which describe internal (somatic) sensations (e.g., ‘You feel short of
breath. Why?’), and external events (n = 7), which describe general and social sce-
narios (e.g., ‘You smell smoke. Why?’). When presented with these scenarios partic-
ipants were instructed to write the first explanation that came to them (open-ended
response). For internal items, responses were scored as either anxiety-related (e.g.,
‘I’m having a panic attack’, score = 1), harm-related (e.g., ‘I’m having a heart
attack’, score = 1) or benign (e.g., ‘I have indigestion’, score = 0). For external items,
responses were scored as either threat (e.g., ‘The house is on fire’, score = 1) or
nonthreat (e.g., ‘It’s just the sound of the wind’, score = 0). Responses were scored
independently by the two authors who were blind to the participants’ panic status
and attachment type. An interrater reliability of .98 was established, and discrepan-
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cies were resolved via discussion between the two scorers. On the page following
the open-ended responses, participants were presented with three experimenter-pro-
vided options which they were asked to rank according to the order in which they
would be most likely to come to their mind. One alternative was always negative,
with the remaining options being either both benign, or one benign and one posi-
tive. None of the alternatives specifically mentioned anxiety or panic. Scoring was
based according to the ranking given to the negative explanation: ranked first
(score = 2), ranked second (score = 1), ranked third (score = 0). In total, five scores
were obtained from the BBSIQ:
1. The number of internal scenarios interpreted as threatening on the open-ended
questions (possible range: 0–7). Consistent with Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, and
Swindell (1993) and Clark et al. (1997), two threat scores were derived from the
open-ended internal scenarios:
(a) Narrow criterion of threat; the number of responses rated as harm-related
only (0–7)
(b) Broad criterion of threat; the number of responses rated as either harm- or
anxiety-related (0–7).
2. The number of external scenarios interpreted as threatening on the open-ended
questions (possible range: 0–7).
3. The sum of the internal threat rankings from the internal rank-ordered ques-
tions (possible range: 0–14).
4. The sum of external threat rankings from the external rank-ordered questions
(possible range: 0–14).
Procedure
Testing sessions were conducted on an individual basis. A clinical interview (Prime-
MD) was administered to ascertain the participant’s clinical status. Participants
identified in the interview as NCPs were asked to complete the PDSS in order to
clarify and confirm the Prime-MD assessment. Participants were then asked to com-
plete the AQ-M, the ASI and the BBSIQ in a counterbalanced fashion.
Results
Significance testing of differences on all measures across panic status (NAC/NCP)
and attachment type (secure/insecure) was done separately using one-way
MANOVAs. Ideally, two-way analyses investigating the interaction between the
two independent variables (panic status and attachment style) would be conducted;
however, the use of two-way analyses on the sample would have resulted in too few
cases per cell to ensure statistical validity and adequate power.
To indicate significant main effects, Pillai’s criterion was employed due to its
robustness against small sample size, unequal n values and violation of assumptions
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Eta squared served as effect size where according to
Clark-Carter (1997) η2 = 0.01 is small; η2 = 0.059 is moderate and η2 > 0.138 is
considered to be a large effect. In screening for normality, three BBSIQ variables
were found to be positively skewed (internal open-ended — narrow criterion;
internal — ranked response; external — open-ended). Correction was made via
square root transformation.




Interpretation of Ambiguous Stimuli and Anxiety Sensitivity by Secure
and Insecure Attachment Styles
A one-way MANOVA was conducted to examine differences in anxiety sensitivity
and catastrophic misinterpretation across attachment style. Participants’ total score
on the ASI and scores on the BBSIQ subscales served as the dependent variables. The
means and standard deviations of securely and insecurely attached participants on the
ASI and all five BBSIQ interpretation measures are presented in Table 1. No signifi-
cant multivariate effect was found for attachment style, F(6, 62) = 1.59, p > .05, with
power of .57.
Interpretation of Ambiguous Stimuli and Anxiety Sensitivity 
by Panic Status
A one-way MANOVA was conducted to examine differences in anxiety sensitivity and
catastrophic misinterpretation between NCPs and NACs. The means and standard
deviations of NACs and NCPs on the ASI and all five BBSIQ interpretation measures
are presented in Table 2. A significant multivariate effect was found for panic status,
F(6, 62) = 4.05, p < .01, with a large effect size (η2 = 0.28) and high power of .96.
Subsequent univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed a significant dif-
ference across panic status on the broad criterion of threat, F(1, 67) = 9.52, p < .01,
with a moderate effect size (η2 = 0.12) and adequate power (.86). NCPs made signifi-
cantly more harm- and anxiety-related interpretations (broad criterion of threat)
than did NACs. No significant differences were found for the narrow criterion of
threat (harm-related interpretations only), F(1, 67) = 0.77, p > .05; the external
open-ended, F(1, 67) = 2.53, p > .05; internal threat rankings, F(1, 67) = 3.08, p >
.05; or external threat rankings, F(1, 67) = 0.07, p > .05. Additionally, no significant
differences were found for ASI scores, F(1, 67) = 0.49, p > .05.
Discussion
The results failed to support the first hypothesis that insecurely attached individuals
would make more harm-related interpretations of ambiguous stimuli than securely
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TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations on the Anxiety Sensitivity Index and Brief Bodily
Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire Subscales for Securely Attached and Insecurely
Attached Participants
Secure attachment (n = 55) Insecure attachment (n = 14)
M SD M SD
Anxiety sensitivity 19.07 6.83 22.64 7.81
BBSIQ internal stimuli
Narrow — open-ended 0.25 0.48 0.24 0.49
Broad — open-ended 1.31 1.22 1.29 1.20
Internal rankings 0.75 0.84 1.18 0.94
BBSIQ external stimuli
External — open-ended 0.64 0.66 0.91 0.89
External rankings 1.89 2.48 3.29 2.40
attached individuals. No significant difference was found between securely and inse-
curely attached individuals on any of the five BBSIQ subscales measuring catas-
trophic misinterpretation. Given that one’s attachment style in adolescence is
widely considered to be a straightforward continuation of one’s attachment
behaviour in childhood (Bowlby, 1969, 1973), there is no evidence from this study
therefore of a link between early attachment experiences and the development of
interpretive bias.
Whereas previous research has only considered attachment theory in relation to
anxiety and anxiety disorders in aggregate, the present study was the first to investi-
gate the relationship of attachment style to panic-related cognitive variables specifi-
cally. However, it is possible that the relationship may not exist in the specific case of
spontaneous panic or PD. Therefore, the failure to find a significant difference
between attachment styles on catastrophic misinterpretation may be because insecure
attachment experiences are related to anxiety generally, rather than to the specific
cognitive correlates of panic.
The second hypothesis predicted that NCPs would be more likely to catastroph-
ically misinterpret ambiguous stimuli than NACs. This hypothesis was partially sup-
ported, with NCPs making significantly more harm-related interpretations of
interoceptive stimuli (based on the broad criterion of threat only) than did NACs.
However, no differences were found between NCPs and NACs for any of the other
BBSIQ subscales. This suggests that NCPs tended to make more anxiety-related
interpretations (e.g., ‘I am going to panic’) of ambiguous internal stimuli. Therefore,
the experience of NCP may serve as an antecedent to anxiety-related interpreta-
tion, but not harm-related interpretations.
There appears to be consistency between the findings from this study and several
others (e.g., Harvey et al., 1993; Richards et al., 2001) in that panickers’ (both
NCP and PD) tend to make more anxiety-related interpretations of ambiguous
internal stimuli (i.e., the broad criterion of threat measure) than nonanxious con-
trols. However, whether these anxiety-related responses qualify as true catastrophic
misinterpretations depends upon what the individual believes will occur as a result




Means and Standard Deviations on the Anxiety Sensitivity Index and Brief Bodily
Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire Subscales for Nonclinical Panickers and
Nonanxious Controls
Nonanxious control (n = 58) Nonclinical panic (n = 11)
M SD M SD
Anxiety Sensitivity 19.53 6.71 21.18 9.28
BBSIQ Internal Stimuli
Narrow criterion 0.27 0.49 0.13 0.43
Broad criterion 1.12* 1.03 2.27* 1.62
Internal rankings 0.76 0.85 1.25 0.88
BBSIQ External Stimuli
External open-ended 0.75 0.70 0.39 0.73
External rankings 2.14 2.56 2.36 2.34
Note: *denotes significant difference at p < .01.
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of the anxiety/panic, which may or may not be catastrophic (see Austin &
Richards, 2001). As such, unequivocal support for Clark’s (1986) catastrophic mis-
interpretation model cannot be established from the results of these studies.
The third hypothesis predicted that insecurely attached individuals would
demonstrate higher levels of anxiety sensitivity than securely attached individuals.
This hypothesis was not supported, with no significant difference being found
between securely and insecurely attached participants’ levels of anxiety sensitivity.
This finding is contrary to that of Weems et al. (2002), who found that insecurely
attached individuals demonstrated significantly higher levels of anxiety sensitivity
than did securely attached individuals. However, a dearth of literature exists in this
area, with Weems et al. apparently the only researchers to consider it previously.
Although the results of this study failed to support the hypothesis that anxiety sen-
sitivity is related to attachment security, it is clearly an area in need of further
research before any definitive conclusions can be drawn.
It is important to acknowledge the small sample size obtained for this study and
the subsequent low power of some of the statistical tests. In particular, the low
number of participants in both the NCP group and the insecurely attached group
made it impossible to investigate any possible interaction between attachment style
and panic status. Although the NCP group was relatively small (n = 11), the 16%
prevalence of NCP obtained in this sample is consistent with rates reported in past
research. In a sample aged between 12 and 17 years, King, Ollendick, Mattis, Yang,
and Tonge (1996) found that 16% had experienced a panic attack in the past, and
Mattis and Ollendick (2002) reported a 16.5% prevalence of panic exprience in a
sample of Australian university students aged between 18 and 19 years.
Conversely, the prevalence of the three attachment styles in this study was not
consistent with previous research. In the present study, 80% of participants were
securely attached, 16% were avoidantly attached and 4% were anxiously/ambiva-
lently attached. In comparison, Hazan and Shaver (1987) found in a combined
community and student sample that 56% of participants were securely attached,
24% were avoidantly attached and 20% were anxiously/ambivalently attached.
These prevalence rates correspond closely with Ainsworth et al.’s (1978) original
findings in infancy. Therefore, the present sample was quite atypical in their attach-
ment typologies, with a much larger percentage being securely attached and far less
insecurely attached than in previous research.
An alternative explanation for this unexpected finding was the use of the AQ-
M as a measure of attachment style. The original Attachment Questionnaire (AQ)
developed by Hazan and Shaver (1987) has been reported to demonstrate adequate
reliability and validity in past studies; however, some researchers have criticised its
use (e.g., Bradford & Lyddon, 1994; Collins & Read, 1990). Three major limita-
tions of the AQ have been identified. First, each description contains statements
pertaining to distinct aspects of relationships (e.g., the secure description includes
two facets: being comfortable with closeness and being able to depend on others).
Thus, respondents must endorse one entire description that may not be truly repre-
sentative of their feelings on both dimensions. Second, it is impossible to evaluate
the degree to which a chosen attachment style characterises a person. And finally,
the discrete nature of the AQ assumes each attachment style to be mutually
exclusive, thereby forcing participants to choose one style over another. Having
mutually exclusive categories rules out the possibility of overlap between attach-
ment styles and assumes a valid description of all adult attachment styles has been
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provided. Therefore, although some support for the use of the AQ exists it has also
been the subject of considerable criticism, and as such, whether it truly represents a
valid and reliable measure of attachment remains contentious. A further limitation
of the AQ-M was the possibility that participants may have been influenced by a
social desirability bias. That is, participants may not have wanted to select descrip-
tions that appeared unfavourable or maladjusted (i.e., the insecure styles), and
instead chose the most socially acceptable response (i.e., the secure style).
Research into the developmental antecedents of panic remains in its infancy. To
our knowledge, the present study was the first to consider the relationship between
attachment style and interpretive bias in a nonclinical population of panickers.
Although the findings were not generally supportive of the hypotheses, future
research in this area is warranted. In particular, investing effort in longitudinal
research should provide invaluable insight into the role, if any, of early childhood
attachment experiences in the development of panic, while also enabling
researchers to identify possible causative mechanisms underlying the development
of cognitive correlates of panic and indeed panic itself.
This study provided some useful replication of previous research investigating
Clark’s (1986) catastrophic misinterpretation model of panic. The finding that
NCPs made significantly more threat-related interpretations of interoceptive stim-
uli only when using the broad criterion of threat is, at best, only partially supportive
of the model. In order to clarify the nature of anxiety-related threat interpretation,
in terms of whether or not it constitutes true catastrophe, the development of an
additional measure of participants’ beliefs regarding the outcome of anxiety/panic
interpretations may prove useful.
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